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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
V.

CaseNo.20110015-CA

JULIO I. MARTINEZ
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Mr. Martinez responds to the State's arguments by contending that 1) he
properly marshaled all facts relevant to the trial court's decision, 2) that the trial court
failed to adequately inquire into the nature of the conflict between Mr. Martinez and
his counsel mid-trial, and 3) that his counsel had an actual conflict of interest with
him, which would mandate a new trial.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT PROPERLY MARSHALED THE FACTS

In its brief, the State contends that defendant failed to properly marshal the
facts surrounding the trial court's decision. Alpe's Br. at 25-29. However, at no point
in the State's brief does it cite a fact that defendant did not mention in his brief. In
fact, defendant fully marshaled all of the facts involving the trial court's decision. The
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State acknowledges that the defendant recited "numerous facts" but claims they were
not fully marshaled. Aple's Br. at 26.
The State first claims that the defendant failed to properly marshal the trial
court's findings on pretrial motions. Aple's Br. at 26-27. However, this argument fails
appreciate the substance of defendant's argument. Defendant did not allege that the
trial court erroneously decided the pretrial motions. Rather, he contended that the
trial court, when faced with concrete allegations of an actual conflict of interest midtrial, failed to properly inquire into, and resolve, those conflicts.1 Aplt's Br. at 29-31.
The State actually acknowledges the substance of the defendant's complaint—
that mid-trial "the court did summarily reject" Mr. Martinez's complaint. Aple's Br. at
27 (emphasis added). While it is true that the defendant raised a conflict with counsel
pre-trial, the court appears to have properly heard and addressed those complaints.
But when new allegations were raised mid-trial, specifically that his counsel now felt
intimidated by Mr. Martinez, had made poor strategic decisions, and now felt that
their ability to fully represent Mr. Martinez was compromised, the court "summarily
rejected]" not the original pretrial motion, but these new arguments based on newlyalleged facts. This is the essence of Mr. Martinez's argument. In fact, the pretrial
motions shed little light on the issues the trial court faced mid-trial. In short, the

1

The State acknowledged defendant only argued the impropriety of the mid-trial
motion in his initial brief. Aple's Br. at 27 n. 7.
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defendant fully marshaled the facts as to the allegations mid-trial, but did not feel the
pretrial denials were erroneous under those circumstances.
Second, the State seems to imply that defendant did not marshal the facts about
the court's mid-trial inquiry when he claimed defense counsel felt "extremely
threatened," but when he omitted one of the court's statements that the State
interprets to mean that "no actual threats were involved, only intimidation." Aplt's Br.
at 28. This claim misconstrues the court's statement and, of its own right, omits
several pages of context in the record.
As articulated in several pages of defendant's opening brief, the court
repeatedly discovered that defense counsel felt "extremely threatened" by Mr.
Martinez to the point that, by defense counsel's own admission, it compromised their
"ability to continue to adequately and zealously represent Mr. Martinez in trial." Aplt's
Br. at 9-12; R. 344:7. In fact, the court found that the intimidation had led defense
counsel "to do things that would otherwise be against your professional judgment."
Aplt's Br. at 10 (citing R. 344:7). The State omitted to reference the prosecutor's
argument to the court that if "there have been actual threats of harm directed toward
[defense counsel, then] I would have a duty to investigate that...." R. 344:9. The court
claimed the State's concerns were "a whole different issue." R. 344:9. The prosecutor
disagreed, saying that "legitimate threats of harm" were different from intimidation.
R. 344:9. She asked to discuss this with defense counsel, at which point the court said,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"My sense right now ... is that it's more of the latter of the intimidation, but that's not
the point." R. 344:9. The court did not find, as the State claims, that these matters
involved mere intimidation. The court's "sense" was that the matter involved only
intimidation, but at no point did the court fully inquire into and resolve that issue.
This goes to the heart of Mr. Martinez's complaint—the trial court never inquired into
the problem, even when asked by the State to do so, because it claimed that resolution
of that issue did not matter.
The State also claims that Mr. Martinez "acknowledges but does not properly
marshal" his own actions which justified the court's finding. Aple's Br. at 28 (emphasis
added). Particularly, the State argues that Defendant's inconsistent arguments about
counsel's communication, a severance motion, withdrawl of the substitution request,
and stare-down somehow were not properly marshaled. Aple's Br. at 28-29.
Unfortunately, it is unclear to Mr. Martinez how his inconsistencies somehow relate
to his argument. As the State acknowledges, Defendant raised all of these issues as part
of his brief. Aple's Br. at 28. None of these issues, assuming their truth, affects the
court's responsibility to inquire into the nature of the conflict. Defendant came into
court for his second day of trial and was surprised by this "new" information that his
attorneys feared him and had spoken with the presiding judge about the problem. R.
344:15. The court informed defendant of what had happened, then said it was going
forward with trial. R. 344:15-16. Mr. Martinez asked for new counsel and the court
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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responded that it had already denied that motion for no basis. R. 344:17. Mr. Martinez
asserted that there were new issues that day which justified the motion. R. 344:17-18.
Mr. Martinez, himself, asserted his claim:
My lawyers, they feel intimidated by me, so, therefore, we have a conflict of
interest. So therefore, they feel they are afraid of me or whatever their
complaints would be. So, therefore, there's a conflict between me and the
lawyers. So, therefore, I don't see how we can, you know, communicate without
me feeling that there's a fear between me and them.
R. 344:23. The fact that Mr. Martinez had regular communication with counsel
previously, was at court when his motion to sever was denied, withdrew his
substitution request, and stared-down the court does nothing to rebut defendant's two
arguments: that the court failed to fully inquire into the nature of the current conflict
and that his ability to adequately communicate with his counsel was presently
compromised. In short, defendant does not see how a failure to discuss the
applicability of issues not relevant to his argument—nonetheless issues he properly
cited and articulated in his brief—somehow relates to a failure to marshal.

II. THE TRIAL COURT INADEQUATELY INQUIRED
INTO THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT
The State contends that the trial court adequately inquired into the nature of
the conflict. Aplt's Br. at 38. As support for this proposition, it cites the court's pretrial
decision and a prior day's discussion on a completely different issue as "illustrative of
the court's willingness to fairly consider Defendant's complaint." Aplt's Br. at 35.
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However, none of these examples has any relevance to the adequacy of the mid-trial
inquiry, which Mr. Martinez contends was merely perfunctory.
In support of the adequacy of the mid-trial inquiry, the State argues that the
court adequately apprised itself of the intimidation through discussions with counsel,
the defendant, and Judge Hilder. Aplt's Br. at 36-38. To the State, the court only had
the obligation to determine whether the attorneys had "divided loyalties that actually
affected their performance" and that Mr. Martinez's actions were irrelevant to this
analysis. Aplt's Br. at 38.
At no point does the State argue that the court conducted a thorough analysis
of whether an actual conflict of interest existed. In fact, it acknowledges that "[w]hen
Defendant re-raised the same complaint midtrial, the court did summarily reject it.
But by that point, the court already knew the complaint was unfounded ...." Aplt's Br.
at 27. However, at no point did the court engage in any sort of meaningful
questioning.
As cited in the State's brief, "[w]hen a defendant expresses dissatisfaction with
counsel, a trial court 'must make some reasonable, non-suggestive ejforts to determine
the nature of the defendant's complaints;" State v. Lovell 1999 UT 40, f 27, 984 P.2d
382, citing State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (emphasis added).
When the defendant alleges dissatisfaction with trial counsel,
the court must make some reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to determine the
nature of the defendant's complaints and to apprise itself of the facts necessary
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to determine whether the defendant's relationship with his or her appointed
attorney has deteriorated to the point that sound discretion requires
substitution or even to such an extent that his or her Sixth Amendment right to
counsel would be violated but for substitution. Even when the trial judge
suspects that the defendant's requests are disingenuous and designed solely to
manipulate the judicial process and to delay the trial, perfunctory questioning is
not sufficient.
Pursifelly 746 P.2d at 273 (emphasis added).
The following bullet points quickly summarize the court's inquiry, and is
merely just another way of restating the information already summarized.
•

The court summarized defense counsel's interactions with Judge Hilder
the prior evening and defense counsel agreed with the summary. R. 344:6

•

In response to defense counsel's complaint of their "ability to continue to
adequately and zealously represent Mr. Martinez in trial," the court told
them that it was their "duty" to do so, then stated that Mr. Martinez's
intimidation led counsel to act against their professional judgment. R.
344:7. Defense counsel agreed with the statement. Id.

•

The court noted a previous case in which similar complaints were raised
after trial, "not in the heat of the battle" and asked whether it should be
similar in this case, if the State should have "a chance to noodle" the
question. R. 344:8.

•

The State asked to investigate claims of actual threats. R. 344:8. The court
told the State that that issue was "not the point." R. 344:8.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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•

The court told defense counsel that if future intimidation occurred to
"call... bullshit. ... Right?" R. 344:9.

•

The court discussed what it was going to tell Ms. Shreve about improper
impeachment, saying that the mistakes were "water under the bridge." R.

•

344:10.
•

The court let both sides discuss the issue and took a five-minute recess.

£

R. 344:11-12.
•

The prosecutor told the court that after speaking with defense counsel,
defense counsel would "represent [ Mr. Martinez] with the integrity of
court officers and do their job like they should." R. 344:11.

t
•

The court lectured Ms. Shreve about the impropriety of the
impeachment the previous evening. R. 344:12.

i
•

Mr. Tan expressed concerns about zealously representing Mr. Martinez
stating that he could not disclose the bases of the intimidation. R. 344:13.

•

The court said that Mr. Tan would have to disclose the intimidation at a

*

minimum. R. 344:13.
•

Mr. Tan discussed his obligations to the court, the well being of his client
and Ms. Shreve said that she wanted to go forward since the "State is
going to help me out." R. 344:13.
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•

The court brought out Mr. Martinez and told him about the previous
night's ruling, then disclosed the intimidation. R. 344:14-15.

•

The court mentioned that counsel "whether rightfully or wrongfully" felt
intimidated. R. 344:15. It cited the improper impeachment, saying that "I
don't know if that's a fair example or not." R. 344:15-16. The court then
said it was going forward with the trial. R. 344:16.

•

The defendant admitted the court was right about the previous night's
ruling, then the court told him about ineffective assistance and stated
that he "had never taken your concerns lightly." R. 344:16-17.

•

Mr. Martinez said he wanted new counsel and the court denied it
reasoning the issue had already been litigated. R. 344:17.

•

The defendant claimed that new issues came up that day and iterated
many of his complaints. R. 344:17-18.

•

The court warned the defendant about disclosing information in
violation of the attorney client privilege. R. 344:18.

•

The court told Mr. Martinez that he would not get counsel of his choice
and that the issue had already been decided: "it's not possible to just
bring in two new lawyers in the middle of a trial. It may be that you use it
as an argument for some appeal...." R. 344:19. It then asked counsel
about their office's conflict procedures. R. 344:19.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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•

Defense counsel disputed the allegation that they weren't moving to
sever the case. R. 344:19. The court said that "[w]e don't need to go into
that" since it "may or may not be the basis for an appropriate motion in
the future where there's new counsel." R. 344:20.

•

The court then told defendant about a prior murder case where there is
"a process to work through" and reiterated it would treat Mr. Martinez
with respect. R. 344:21.

•

Mr. Martinez said he didn't agree with what the court was doing, the
court said it thought it was making the legally appropriate ruling, and
asked for the next witness. R. 344:21.

•

The court asked Defendant what he wanted. After expressing some
concerns about officers talking in the hallways, defendant asked for new
counsel and for a new trial. R. 344:22.

•

The court said the matter was already denied and asked if Mr. Martinez
looked for new counsel now. R. 344:23. The defendant said he was
because of the new conflict of interest involving intimidation. R. 344:23.

•

The court asked both counsel if they could "vigorously represent" Mr.
Martinez. Both said they could. R. 344:23-24.
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•

The court said that he did not know if the intimidation was "the result of
your own conduct" but that he would not allow Mr. Martinez to
manipulate it so he gets new counsel. R. 344:24.

•

The court asked Mr. Martinez for specific reasons and he argued many
of his pretrial issues. R. 344:24-27.

•

The court denied the motion, which was followed by the stare-down
episode. R. 344:27-28.

This restatement illustrates several key points. First, as articulated in his
opening brief, the court never inquired into the substance of the conflict. The court
only disclosed that there was alleged intimidation, but it made no effort to determine
the extent of the intimidation that counsel felt. Counsel indicated on multiple
occasions in the same hearing that they had serious reservations about their ability to
adequately represent Mr. Martinez. Other than to ask, at the very end, whether they
could continue to adequately represent Mr. Martinez, the court made no efforts to
discover the extent of the conflict or breakdown in communication. Defense counsel
made two polar opposite claims: they declared that they would be unable to zealously
represent Mr. Martinez, and they also said that they could. R. 344:7,13, 23-24. Yet, in
between those two claims, the court did nothing to discover the nature or extent of
these fears.
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One indicator of the court's lack of understanding of the conflict involved the
improper impeachment. The court claimed the impeachment might have been a poor
strategic decision counsel alleged they had had to make. But the court admitted that it
might not have been "a fair example" of a poor strategic decision. R. 344:15-16. This
comment illustrates the court's naivete about the extent of the conflict—it had no idea
whether this was a poor strategic decision defense counsel made. The court only
assumed it was. At no point did counsel disclose this as a poor decision. In other
words, at the point when it ruled on the motion, having done all its questioning, the
court knew nothing about the alleged conflict other than the defendant had allegedly
intimidated counsel. It speculated about everything else.
In addition, the court unfairly expected Mr. Martinez to determine the extent
of a conflict about which he had just been informed and about which he had little to
no information. He was not in a position to evaluate the fears of his attorneys nor the
basis for these fears. He was just informed by the court that the conflict existed. He
complained, naturally, about his counsel, but the court expected him to give specific
reasons why this new conflict, about which he knew little to nothing, was different
from the old ones. Nonetheless, Mr. Martinez maintained the conflict was new and
involved his ability to communicate with his attorneys, now that they feared him.
Finally, the court seems to have misunderstood the nature of how these claims
can be litigated. It referred on multiple occasions that these matters would more
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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properly be resolved post-trial and that this matter had already been litigated. R. 344:8,
17, 19-20, 21, 23. This constitutes a misunderstanding of conflicts that can arise during
trial While true that the issue had been decided pretrial, Mr. Martinez's attorneys
disclosed strong sentiments mid-trial that they claimed, not only caused them to make
poor strategic decisions, but affected their ability to zealously represent him. When
faced with such evidence, a trial court has the ability to appoint conflict counsel. See
State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 382 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (defendant must show good
cause for rejecting court-appointed counsel). It might result in a delay, even a
substantial one, but nothing in the law requires these concerns only to be raised posttrial, as the court repeatedly suggested. The State admits this would have been the
appropriate remedy: "mistrial would have been mandated if an actual conflict existed."
Aple's Br. at 48.2 Ruling on a pretrial substitution motion in no way eliminates the
possibility that new conflicts of interest can arise mid-trial.
When faced with new claims, the court has an obligation to "make some
reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to determine the nature of the defendant's
complaints and to apprise itself of the facts necessary to determine whether the
defendant's relationship with his or her appointed attorney has deteriorated ..."

2

The State contends that mistrial was not warranted since "no actual conflict was
established ..." Aple's Br. at 48.
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Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 273. At no point did the court "apprise itself of the facts" it
needed to determine the extent, and/or nature of the conflict.

Ill, EVIDENCE OF AN ACTUAL CONFLICT EXISTS
The State alleges that Mr. Martinez failed to establish an actual conflict, and as
such, his claim fails. Aple's Br. at 38. However, none of the State's arguments in
rebuttal negate the direct evidence of a conflict—defense counsels' statements that
they would have difficulty zealously representing Mr. Martinez.
First, the State alleges that no conflict existed because Mr. Martinez threatened
his attorneys. Aple's Br. at 39. Defendant did not allege, nor does the record support,
conclusion that he actually threatened his attorneys. In fact, the court made no such
finding. The court only heard from defense counsel, who indicated they felt
threatened by him, but Mr. Martinez never admitted to this conduct. As discussed in
Section II, infra, the court failed to adequately inquire into this matter. At most, Mr.
Martinez asked counsel to file a frivolous motion to suppress, which is hardly a basis
to claim that he caused his attorneys to feel threatened. See Aple's Br. at 40.
The State makes much of the fact that the defendant was difficult with the
court. Aple's Br. at 40. However, defendant's actions with the court cannot be a basis
for claiming that he was the cause of a conflict with his counsel. The court made no
such finding, nor is it justified by anything in the record. The State, in essence, wants
this Court to find that someone who argues with the judge must also have caused a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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conflict with, or threatened his lawyers. Again, the nature of the conflict with Mr.
Martinez's counsel is largely unknown, in part because it is based on counsels' nondisclosure and limited statement that they felt threatened.
The State also claims that since Mr. Martinez's attorneys "actively represent[ed]
him," he lacks a basis to show a conflict. Aple's Br. at 40. However, this statement
neglects to consider that defense counsel admitted they had difficulties zealously
representing Mr. Martinez. R. 344:7,13. They also admitted that the intimidation had
caused them to act against their professional judgment. R. 344:7. However, the record
does not support what these actions were. While the State claims this amounted to a
single improper impeachment that arguably benefitted the defendant, the record does
not support such an assertion. As discussed previously, the court did not determine
what these improper decisions were, so one cannot speculate to their substance.
However, the decisions clearly impacted counsels' approach to the case, as they
admitted. Only after guarantees of State protection did defense counsel feel like they
could go forward. R. 344:13, 137.
Defendant claimed several examples of what appears from the record to be
events that compromised defense counsels' ability to zealously represent Mr.
Martinez. Aplt's Br. at 29-31. The State contends that although Shreve was "followed
home the first night of trial" and did not report this to the court, she "did not let the
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incident impact her willingness to proceed with Defendant's trial." Aple's Br. at 41.
Unfortunately, we no little, to nothing of what occurred, less Ms. Shreve's fears.
When the court disclosed this matter to Mr. Tan and the State, the prosecutor
felt the matter was serious enough to merit full disclosure and a criminal investigation.
R. 360:4. The record demonstrates little of Ms. Shreve's feelings, other than a few key
facts. Ms. Shreve was followed home after trial on the first day, and she reported the
matter to police. R. 360:3-4. Ms. Shreve came late to court on the second day, and had
a conversation with the prosecutor, who apparently promised to protect her from Mr.
Martinez. R. 344:11 (prosecutor "talked with [defense counsel] about some safety
measures that we could take to perhaps help alleviate any concerns they might have");
344:13 (Ms. Shreve told the court that "[w]e're worried. I'm okay. Let's go. The State is
going to help me out.); 344:137 (Ms. Shreve told the court that "after sleeping on it,
waking up this morning with some additional security that I felt like I am comfortable
to go forward and advocate for my client and not allow this [to] affect my ability to
represent him."). While Ms. Shreve did formally indicate that she could zealously
represent Mr. Martinez, this was only after the State agreed to "help [her] out" and
protect her from Mr. Martinez. Id.; 344:24. An attorney who labors in fear of her
client, and who needs State protection to ensure she feels ok, clearly has a
compromised ability to represent the client.
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Perhaps the biggest problem with Ms. Shreve's representation of Mr. Martinez
was that she apparently feared Mr. Martinez was connected to the following-home
episode and had called the police about it. An attorney would have a difficult time
zealously representing a client against whom she has called the police. Granted, Ms.
Shreve did not call the police on Mr. Martinez, but she feared his connection to the
following-home episode enough that she needed the State's protection to go forward
and try the case.
The State also asserts defense counsels' fear that they could not zealously
represent Mr. Martinez was repudiated "upon further reflection." Aple's Br. at 42.
However, as discussed infra, defense counsel made two such statements—they worried
about their ability to be zealous—in the same hearing, and mere minutes before the
subsequent repudiation when the defendant was present in court. See Section II, infra.
The State's contention that the repudiation happened a day later fails to take into
account that two contradictory statements were made in the same hearing.
The post-verdict motion to withdraw, may, as the State asserts, be asserted to
allege an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which is what happened in this case.
Aple's Br. at 42. However, just because a withdrawl may happen to allege ineffective
assistance, it does not mean that the withdrawl may not be evidence of an actual
conflict of interest. Clearly, if counsel had an actual conflict of interest, they would be
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obligated to withdraw. So the withdrawl might be the best indication of an actual
conflict, as argued in Defendant's opening brief.
Finally, the State argues that defense counsel's tactic of admitting guilt was a
trial strategy calculated to reduce Mr. Martinez's potential sentence. Aple's Br. at 43-

•

46. Defense counsel asked the jury to find Mr. Martinez guilty of every offense
charged, with the exception of a reduction from Attempted Murder to Aggravated

4

Assault. R. 345:24-27.
The State argues that it is "well-recognized that an attorney who actively
advocates for a defendant during trial may choose to concede some guilt in closing
argument, if in doing so, the defense gains credibility or other strategic advantage."
4
Aple's Br. at 44. This, however, is not the entire state of law, since defense counsel may
not concede guilt without his client's consent, except in limited situations.
The decision of whether to plead guilty rests with the defendant, and not with

'

his counsel. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 77 L. Ed. 2d 987, 103 S. Ct. 3308
(1983) ("the accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions
regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty ..."). Recently, commentators have
been uniformly calling for courts to require defendants to make these concessions of
guilt, rather than counsel.3

3

Heidi H. Woessner, Criminal Law-The Crucible of Adversarial Testing:
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Unauthorized Concessions of Client's Guilt, 24 W.
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<

Many courts have held that defense counsel may not waive this right for his
client without his consent. See State v. Harbison, 337 S.E.2d 504, 507-08 (N.C. 1985),
cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1123, 90 L. Ed. 2d 672, 106 S. Ct. 1992 (1986) (per se ineffective
assistance of counsel "has been established in every criminal case in which the
defendant's counsel admits the defendant's guilt to the jury without the defendant's
consent."); Cox v. Hutto, 589 F.2d 394, 395-96 (8th Cir. 1979) (defense attorney
cannot stipulate to a defendant's prior convictions for purposes of a habitual offender
enhancement without the defendant's consent); People v. Hattery, 488 N.E.2d 513, 519

NEW ENG. L. REV. 315, 348 (2002) (arguing that defendants should hold the right to
concede guilt, not their counsel); Kimberly Helene Zelnick, In Gideon's Shadow: The
Loss of Defendant Autonomy and the Growing Scope of Attorney Discretion, 30 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 363, 397 (2003) ("when counsel overrides a defendants decisions regarding
how the defendant wishes to exercise his personal constitutional rights, counsel has
ceased to function as his clients advocate"); Robert J. Nolan, Prejudice Presumed: The
Decision to Concede Guilt to Lesser Offenses During Opening Statements, 55 HASTINGS
LJ. 965, 985 (2004) ("When defense counsel concedes guilt during opening
statements, however, she completely relieves the prosecution of proving guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Moreover, defense counsel takes the decision about the defendant's
guilt as to the lesser-included offense out of the hands of the jury by effectively
entering an unauthorized guilty plea as to the lesser-included offense on behalf of the
defendant. In such cases, a presumption of prejudice is warranted ..."); Sharon G.
Scudder, With Friends Like You, Who Needs a fury? A Response to the Legitimization
of Conceding a Client's Guilt, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 137,179 (2006) ("In the cases in
which concession of guilt is part of a strategy, the defendant must have the final
decision whether to pursue this strategy for the same well-established reasons he must
decide as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will
testify. Allowing an attorney to relinquish his role as a zealous advocate and concede a
client's guilt without his consent is damaging to the profession and the criminal justice
system.")
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(111. 1986) ("Counsel may not concede his client's guilt in the hope of obtaining a more
lenient sentence where a plea of not guilty has been entered, unless the record
adequately shows that defendant knowingly and intelligently consented to his
counsel's strategy."); State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138, 1148 (Kan. 2000) (defense counsel

•

may not concede guilt, and counsel's concession, without client's consent constituted
a "breakdown in our adversarial system of justice" warranting no separate showing of

^

prejudice); State v. Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90, 96 (Minn. 1990) ("defendant was denied a
fair trial and effective assistance of counsel entitling him to a new trial when his

i
attorney conceded, without defendant's permission, that defendant was guilty of heat of-passion manslaughter"); State v. Wiplinger, 343 N.W.2d 858, 861 (Minn. 1984) ("if
a defense counsel impliedly admits a defendant's guilt without the defendant's
permission or acquiescence, the defendant should be given a new trial even if it can be
said that the defendant would have been convicted in any event."); Jones v. State, 877

'

P.2d 1052,1059 (Nev. 1994) (defense counsel "undermined his client's testimonial
disavowal of guilt during the guilt phase of the trial," which warranted a reversal).

j

Defense counsel has options, even in a case like this one in which there is little
controvertible evidence. "In every criminal case, a defense attorney can, at the very
least, hold the State to its burden of proof by clearly articulating to the jury or factfinder that the State must establish each element of the crime charged and that a
i

conviction can only be based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Nixon v.
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Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618,625 (Fla. 2000). Defense counsel did not have to concede
guilt, nor could he without his client's consent. He could have merely informed the
jury of the State's burden and the elements they have the obligation to prove.
Defendant does not allege ineffective assistance of counsel under a Strickland
standard, rather he asserts that, as previously argued, defense counsel's failure to act as
a meaningful advocate, and to concede Mr. Martinez's guilt on all of the offenses,
(albeit with a recommendation of a lesser-included on the most serious offense)
constitutes significant evidence of the existence of an actual conflict of interest. It
shows how counsel, although they might have said otherwise, did not zealously
represent Mr. Martinez by making the State prove all of its claims beyond a reasonable
doubt. Counsel conceded guilt without Mr. Martinez's consent—a clear indication of
the lack counsel's lack of zeal. Counsel clearly advocated for Mr. Martinez, but did not
represent him to the fullest.
The State's arguments regarding the lack of harm to Mr. Martinez are
inapplicable to the case at hand, since because there was an actual conflict of interest,
he has shown good cause for substitution of counsel. See Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 382
(Utah Ct. App. 1997); Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 272.
In short, none of the State's arguments effectively rebut the claims that defense
counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest.
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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendant argues that the trial court failed to properly
and fully inquire into the nature of the conflict between Mr. Martinez and his counsel
and that his counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest and as such, he is
entitled to a new trial.
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